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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
The Fair Punishment Project is a joint
initiative of Harvard Law School’s Charles Hamilton
Houston Institute for Race & Justice and its
Criminal Justice Institute. In seeking to ensure that
the U.S. justice system is fair and accountable, we
highlight the gross injustices resulting from
prosecutorial
misconduct,
ineffective
defense
lawyering, and racial bias, and challenge the
unconstitutional use of excessive punishment.
The Jacobs Burns Center for Ethics in the
Practice of Law at Cardozo School of Law sponsors
courses, programs, and events that provoke dialogue
and critical thought on ethical and moral issues of
professional responsibility. The Center helps prepare
students to face, with integrity, the difficult and
important questions that arise in all areas of legal
practice. In the past five years, the Center’s work
has focused upon ethical issues in the criminal
justice system, and includes conferences, programs,
and publications related to the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion and ethical obligations of
criminal defense lawyers.
The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics
works in collaboration with law students,
practitioners, judges and legal scholars to study and
improve the legal profession by: honoring exemplary
Pursuant to Rule 37.2 of the Rules of this Court, the
parties were timely notified of amici’s intent to file this brief.
Petitioner and Respondent have consented to the filing of this
brief. The letters granting consent are filed herewith. Pursuant
to Rule 37.6, this brief was not written in whole or in part by
counsel for any party, and no person or entity other than
amicus and its counsel has made a monetary contribution to
the preparation and submission of this brief.
1

1

lawyers; inculcating ethics into teaching law;
training future lawyers “in the service of others”;
incorporating ethical and professional values into
academic and mentoring programs; and encouraging
scholarly inquiry and scholarship on the professional
conduct and regulation of lawyers. Above all, the
Stein Center fosters an understanding of “ethical
legal practice” that goes beyond adherence to the
rules set forth in professional codes of conduct.
The Ethics Bureau at Yale drafts amicus
briefs in cases concerning professional responsibility;
assists defense counsel with ineffective assistance of
counsel claims relating to professional responsibility;
and offers ethics advice and counsel on a pro bono
basis to not-for-profit legal service providers, courts,
and law schools. 2
Our organizations respectfully submit this
brief because we have an abiding interest in
ensuring that courts recognize and enforce
prosecutors’ constitutional obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence. We believe that when courts
do not enforce Brady, they not only damage the
integrity of the proceedings at issue, but also
undermine public confidence in the legal system.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Efforts to hold Louisiana prosecutors to
account for withholding exculpatory evidence have
failed. Every mechanism for accountability—judicial
review, attorney discipline, civil liability—is
currently unfit for the task. Indeed, in the Angola
The references to amici’s affiliations are for
identification purposes only. This brief does not necessarily
reflect the views of the above-mentioned universities or law
schools.
2
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Five prosecutions of Mr. Brown and his codefendants who were charged with killing a prison
guard during an escape attempt, attorneys for one of
Mr. Brown’s co-defendants filed a disciplinary
complaint against the prosecutors who took the
suppressed statement that Mr. Brown’s attorneys
discovered only after his capital trial. The Louisiana
Attorney Disciplinary Board’s Office of Disciplinary
Counsel dismissed the complaint “[b]ecause the
same Court that would consider the potential ethics
violation has already determined that the statement
was not ‘favorable’ . . . .” Letter from Charles B.
Plattsmier, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, La. Attorney
Disciplinary Bd., to Lawrence T. Dupre (Feb. 29,
2016) (hereinafter “ODC Letter”) (attached at
Appendix A) at p. 3-4. The Louisiana Supreme
Court’s ruling in Brown thus not only deprived him
of the new penalty phase he deserves, but also
precludes the professional accountability Louisiana
so clearly needs.
This case presents an important opportunity
to ensure both that defendants’ due process rights
receive the protections they deserve and that
prosecutors behave in accordance with their
professional duties. Judicial enforcement of Brady is
a necessary component of a functional criminal
justice system, especially in the state with the
country’s highest incarceration rate. Too often, the
Louisiana courts misapprehend the constitutional
doctrine, stripping defendants of protections,
incentivizing prosecutorial noncompliance, and
depriving juries and judges of information essential
to the fair determination of both guilt and
punishment. Along with the disciplinary process’s
failure and civil liability’s limited reach, the state
judiciary’s approach amplifies the risk of unfair
3

outcomes, providing a compelling reason for granting
certiorari.
ARGUMENT
I.

LOUISIANA
COURTS
CONSISTENTLY
MISINTERPRET AND MISAPPLY BRADY—
REQUIRING THE FEDERAL COURTS TO
PROVIDE SUPERVISION AND RELIEF
The Louisiana judiciary’s failure to treat

Brady claims appropriately warrants attention. The

“duty to administer justice occasionally requires
busy judges to engage in a detailed review of the
particular facts of a case . . . .” Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 455 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring). That
duty, which arises here for this Court, is particularly
pressing when the state courts’ rulings substantially
delay constitutionally warranted relief. See Wearry
v. Cain, No. 14-10008 (Mar. 7, 2016), slip op. at 11
(“The alternative to granting review, after all, is
forcing [the petitioner] to endure yet more time on
Louisiana’s death row in service of a conviction that
is constitutionally flawed.”).
The courts in Louisiana have consistently
misinterpreted and misapplied Brady and its
progeny. Indeed, this Court has explicated the
doctrine in a number of serious cases arising from
Louisiana. Those cases—and the state courts’ failure
to meaningfully engage them after-the-fact—
underscore the urgency of Mr. Brown’s petition. Not
only do the dispositions in Wearry v. Cain, No. 1410008 (Mar. 7, 2016), Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627
(2012), and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995),
demonstrate that a problem of apperception endures,
but the way in which the state courts ruled also
reveals a deeper pattern of judicial obliviousness.
4

The story of Michael Wearry’s case
underscores the problem with Louisiana state court
review. After his conviction was affirmed on direct
review, “it emerged that the prosecution had
withheld relevant information” that would have
unsettled the State’s case. Wearry, slip op. at 3. The
post-conviction trial court noted that “the State
‘probably ought to have’ disclosed the withheld
evidence” but nevertheless denied relief. Id., slip op.
at 6. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied Wearry’s
writ for review over the votes of one justice who
would have granted relief on a separate ground and
another justice who would have remanded for other
reasons. See State ex rel. Wearry v. Cain, 161 So. 3d
620 (La. 2015). Yet, this Court issued a per curiam
decision over the dissent of two justices finding that
“[b]eyond doubt, the newly revealed evidence suffices
to undermine confidence in Wearry’s conviction . . . .”
Wearry, slip op. at 7 (emphasis added). But no
Louisiana court had expressed a doubt about the
Brady claims. 3
In Smith, this Court issued a powerful
statement. In an 8-1 decision, it found that the
impeachment evidence the State withheld was
material because the relevant witness’s “testimony
was the only evidence linking Smith to the crime.”
132 U.S. at 630 (emphasis in original). Despite the
conspicuous problems with the petitioner’s murder
convictions, no Louisiana judge reached the result
Although this Court’s decision in the petitioner’s favor
in Kyles was accompanied by a four-justice dissent, it is
remarkable that no Louisiana judge found that the State’s
suppression warranted a new trial. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 422.
Especially considering that “[b]ecause the State withheld
evidence, its case was much stronger, and the defense case
much weaker.” Id. at 429.
3

5

this Court did. 4 Yet, this Court made clear that
Brady must mean something and overturned the five
murder convictions at issue. 5 That decision
eventually led to the reversal of Smith’s death
sentence in another murder case because the
overturned convictions were at the heart of the
State’s case for capital punishment. 6
This Court is not the only federal court that
has provided protracted corrective guidance to
Louisiana’s courts. Even constrained by the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”) and considerations of comity, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals and the federal district
courts in Louisiana have overturned state court
Brady decisions on many occasions.
In DiLosa v. Cain, 279 F.3d 259 (5th Cir.
2002), the state appealed the Eastern District’s
grant of Brady relief to Douglas DiLosa on his
See id.; State v. Smith, 45 So.3d 1065 (La. 2010).
Eleven members of Louisiana’s judiciary—the trial court judge,
a panel of three appellate court judges, and all seven Louisiana
Supreme Court justices— ruled against Mr. Smith in what can
be described as a rout of his Brady claims.
4

5
While it appears that several justices were
incredulous with the State’s position at oral argument—one
justice even asked whether the State considered confessing
error—this incredulity and the majority opinion contrasts with
the fact that the State’s position had been a slam-dunk in the
state courts. See Adam Liptak, Justices Rebuke a New Orleans
Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2011; Lyle Denniston,
Argument Recap: Disaster at the Lectern, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov.
8, 2011), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/argument-recapdisaster-at-the-lectern/.

See John Simerman, New Orleans judge voids death
sentence for inmate convicted of 1995 triple murder, TIMES6

PICAYUNE, June 12, 2012, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf
/2012/06/new_orleans_judge_voids_death.html.

6

murder conviction. At trial, the State persuaded
jurors that Mr. DiLosa killed his wife to collect life
insurance proceeds. In his defense, DiLosa claimed
that two African-American intruders had come into
the house and knocked him unconscious before
killing his wife. In post-conviction, DiLosa uncovered
“four main categories of withheld evidence,”
including exculpatory non-Caucasian hair found on
the rope used to strangle the victim, exculpatory
fingerprint evidence, and statements from neighbors
suggesting other criminal activity in the
neighborhood on the night of the murder. Id. at 263.
In affirming the federal district court’s ruling, the
Fifth Circuit—governed by AEDPA—explained:
The state court exceeded the bounds of
permissible application of federal law in
two distinct ways. First, it applied an
incorrect legal principle in concluding
there was no material evidence for
Brady purposes. Second, its ultimate
legal conclusion cannot be squared with
the command of Brady and its progeny.
The state court’s legal conclusion was
objectively unreasonable. 7
279 F.3d at 263-64. Moreover, the state court
“applied a rule of law contrary to” established
Supreme Court precedent because it evaluated the
exculpatory evidence by looking at whether it was
sufficient to exculpate DiLosa rather than “through
The post-conviction trial court denied DiLosa’s Brady
claim on November 13, 1996. A panel of the Louisiana Fifth
Circuit denied a subsequent supervisory writ application. State
v. DiLosa, 97-191 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/2/97). The Louisiana
Supreme Court then unanimously denied a subsequent
supervisory writ application. State v. DiLosa, 709 So.2d 694
(La. 1998).
7

7

the lens of [the court’s] confidence in the verdict.” Id.
at 264. These unreasonable applications of law
required a new trial where “[t]he state [] based its
case on the non-existence of evidence it knew
existed.” Id. at 265. Mr. DiLosa was eventually
exonerated of the crime for which he once faced life
imprisonment. 8
The Fifth Circuit revisited the Louisiana
judiciary’s treatment of Brady in Tassin v. Cain, 517
F.3d 770 (5th Cir. 2008). In that capital case, the
state courts twice refused to grant relief under
Brady. On the first petition for post-conviction relief,
the trial court “reject[ed] Tassin’s claim that the
State’s suppression of the agreement between
[testifying co-defendant] Georgina and the trial court
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.” 517 F.3d at
775. Around the time he filed his federal habeas
petition, Tassin discovered new evidence and filed a
second post-conviction petition in state court. The
state courts denied relief on the supplemented and
amended Brady claims. 9 Id. The Fifth Circuit
explained that “the state habeas court had
erroneously required Robert to show that the court
had ‘promised’ Georgina a lenient sentence . . . .” Id.
at 776. The federal district court correctly held that
the state court’s ruling was “contrary to federal law
because it applied a more stringent standard than
the one established by Supreme Court precedent.”
8 See Page for Douglas Dilosa’s Case, THE NATIONAL
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3178
(last
visited Apr. 25, 2016).
9

Following the post-conviction court’s denial of Tassin’s

Brady claim, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his
supervisory writ application unanimously without opinion.

State ex rel. Tassin v. Cain, 883 So.2d 995 (La. 2004).

8

Id. Tassin did not need to show “a firm ‘promise’”

with the co-defendant existed in order to challenge
her credibility. Id. at 777. On these grounds, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of a new trial given
the “violation of a clear precedent.” Id. at 781.
Like many other Louisiana Brady cases,
“David Mahler’s state post-conviction proceedings
ended when the Louisiana Supreme Court, without
setting forth supporting reasons, denied his writ
application.” 10 Mahler v. Kaylo, 537 F.3d 494, 498
(5th Cir. 2008). The State had withheld evidence
suggesting that the struggle between the victim and
defendant before the homicide was ongoing in nature
rather than complete when Mahler inflicted the fatal
wound. See id. at 503. The post-conviction trial
court’s denial of the Brady claim employed a far-toonarrow view of the suppressed evidence. The Fifth
Circuit explained:
Contrary to the state trial court’s
conclusion, the withheld pretrial
statements do not merely reinforce the
fact established at trial that a
“struggle” had occurred at some point
before Mahler shot Zimmer. Rather,
when considered collectively, they
suggest that Zimmer’s struggle with
Christopher Mahler for the shotgun
was an ongoing event—the outcome of
which remained uncertain—when the
shooting occurred. This stands in stark
Following the trial court’s denial of post-conviction
relief on Mahler’s Brady claim, supervisory writ applications
were denied by a panel of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit, State v.
Mahler, No. 2004-K-1018 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2004), and by a
unanimous Louisiana Supreme Court. State v. Mahler, 893
So.2d 85 (La. 2005).
10

9

contrast to the picture painted by the
prosecution witnesses’ trial testimony
that the struggle had conclusively
ended and Zimmer had already turned
away to run or head toward his truck
before Mahler shot him.

Id. In other words, facts about the shooting’s

circumstances could have made a difference to the
jury’s determination of whether the crime
constituted a murder, manslaughter, or even selfdefense. Noting “the deferential standard of review
required by the AEDPA,” the Fifth Circuit held that
“the state trial court unreasonably applied clearly
established federal law . . . in determining that the
witness statements at issue were not material.” Id.
at 500.
Louisiana state court errors also led to Fifth
Circuit action in LaCaze v. Warden Louisiana Corr.
Inst. for Women, 645 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 2011).
Looking back on Princess LaCaze’s second-degree
murder conviction, the court assessed impeachment
evidence similar to the kind withheld in Tassin—
evidence of a witness’s agreement with the
prosecution that would have helped the defense call
into question the veracity of that co-defendant’s
testimony. While the State in LaCaze provided
notice before trial that it would reduce the charges
against co-defendant Robinson in exchange for his
testimony at LaCaze’s trial, “[t]he State never
disclosed, however, that it had assured Robinson
that his son would not be prosecuted if he agreed to
make a statement implicating LaCaze.” LaCaze, 645
F.3d at 731. After holding an evidentiary hearing,
the post-conviction trial court denied relief, stating
that Robinson did not testify because of the
prosecutor’s
assurances
regarding
potential
10

prosecution of his son and there was “overwhelming”
evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Id. at 733. The
Louisiana Third Circuit found that “the trial court
erred in denying her application for post-conviction
relief,” but “the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed
in a two-paragraph, per curiam opinion, with two
judges noting that they ‘would grant [the writ] and
docket.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). The federal
Fifth Circuit overruled the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s materiality determination, finding—like this
Court did in Smith—that prosecutorial suppression
of
exculpatory
evidence
implicating
the
trustworthiness of “the only direct evidence
presented by the State to show a critical element” of
the crime warranted a new trial. Id. at 738.
Given that the Fifth Circuit granted new
trials in DiLosa, Tassin, Mahler, and LaCaze under
AEDPA, it is not surprising that the court also
reversed Louisiana denials of Brady relief in a
number of pre-AEDPA cases. See, e.g., Lindsey v.
King, 769 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1985) (granting a new
trial to a man sentenced to death); Monroe v.
Blackburn, 607 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1979) (granting a
new trial in an armed robbery case); cf. Blanton v.
Blackburn, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming
Brady relief in murder case granted by federal
district court in the Middle District of Louisiana, see
Blanton v. Blackburn, 494 F.Supp. 895 (M.D.La.
1980)).
So marred is the state courts’ track record
that federal district court judges have had to expend
resources to explain that their determinations of
federal law actually bind the state judiciary. For
example, in Monroe v. Blackburn, 748 F.2d 958 (5th
Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a federal
district court ruling that required the state courts to
11

conduct an evidentiary hearing on Ronald Monroe’s
Brady claim. When the case returned to federal court
after remand, the district court pointed out that it
had previously decided that “Monroe’s due process
Brady rights were violated.” Monroe v. Butler, 690 F.
Supp. 521, 523 (E.D. La. 1988), aff’d, 853 F.2d 924
(5th Cir. 1988) (internal citation omitted). Yet,
“when the state court addressed this same issue” on
remand it held that the petitioner had no Brady
interest at stake. See id. “Thus, the state court
mistakenly rejected [the district court’s] Brady
holding. That the state court erred in this respect is
clear.” Id. Though this case is not recent, the
troubles it exemplifies persist today.
The state courts’ treatment of Brady in
Johnson v. Cain, 68 F. Supp. 3d 593 (E.D. La. 2014),
underscores this reality. As it did in Mahler, the
prosecution in Johnson failed to disclose to the

defense evidence suggesting that the petitioner’s
conduct occurred in a wholly different context than
the one the State presented to the jury at trial. The
State’s key witness initially told police investigators
“a very different version of events on the day of the
incident.” Johnson, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 612. Rather
than the trial version—in which Johnson
purportedly kicked and shot the surviving witness
after he was already on the ground—the police
report detailed a quick exchange in which Mr.
Johnson jumped out of a car and fired at the witness
one time immediately after he saw the witness
punch his brother in the mouth. See id. Instead of
deciding on the merits, the state court denied the
claim on procedural grounds. See id. at 610. Yet,
that procedural bar did not impress the federal
court, which found that the state court imposed it on
the basis of an error in “[s]imple math.” Id. at 610
12

n.11. Reviewing the Brady claim on the merits, the
federal court granted Mr. Johnson relief. Id. at 613.
Federal district courts have provided relief on

Brady claims in several other cases. See Blanton v.
Blackburn, 494 F. Supp. 895 (M.D. La. 1980), aff’d,
654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981); Faulkner v. Cain, 133
F. Supp. 2d 449 (E.D. La. 2001); Robinson v. Cain,
510 F. Supp. 2d 399 (E.D. La. 2007); Perez v. Cain,
2008 WL 108661 (E.D. La. 2008), aff’d, 529 F.3d 588
(5th Cir. 2008); Triplett v. Cain, No. 04-1434 (E.D.

La. 2011). In other instances, federal district court
rulings have paved the way for ultimately favorable
Brady determinations. See Hudson v. Whitley, 979
F.2d 1058, 1060-65 (5th Cir. 1992) (reversing an
adverse procedural ruling and remanding for merits
determination of Brady claim); 11 cf. Kirkpatrick v.
Whitley, 992 F.2d 491, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1993)
(granting an evidentiary hearing on claim that the
prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence).
While federal courts have provided a measure
of corrective oversight, AEDPA significantly limits
the circumstances under which a federal court can
reverse a state conviction. See Peters v. Cain, 34 F.
App’x 151, *1 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“even if
this court would have concluded that such a
probability existed were we looking at the case in the
first instance, we cannot reverse the state court’s
determination that no violation occurred unless it
involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law”). This means that looking
“Based on the . . . prosecutorial misconduct . . . a
Federal District Court vacated Hudson’s conviction and
remanded the case for retrial in February, 1993.” Page for
Larry Hudson’s Case, THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration
/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3313 (last visited Apr. 25, 2016).
11
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only to the universe of cases in which federal courts
ultimately granted habeas relief understates the
persistent problems with state court review. After
all, AEDPA is simply “a ‘guard against extreme
malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,’
not a substitute for ordinary error correction.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)
(internal citation omitted). Add to AEDPA the fact
that Brady materiality determinations are often
difficult, fact-intensive judgment calls, 12 and it
becomes apparent that federal courts only overturn
state
court
Brady denials in exceptional
circumstances.
This brief does not entail an exhaustive
review of all relevant federal habeas rulings.
Instead, it gathers an exemplary set to establish the
proposition that Louisiana’s state courts often
misapply Brady’s critical constitutional commands. 13
II.

OTHER MECHANISMS FOR CURTAILING
THE SUPPRESSION OF EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE HAVE FAILED IN LOUISIANA

Courts have long suggested that prosecutors
will comply with their constitutional obligations
because mechanisms other than judicial review of
12

2009).

See Banks v. Thaler, 583 F.3d 295, 322 (5th Cir.

Notably, in defending his office’s conduct in Kyles,
long-serving Orleans Parish District Attorney Harry Connick
wrote the following in a letter to the editor of the New Orleans
Times Picayune: “In the Kyles case, for example, five separate
state and federal courts on seven different occasions concluded
that my prosecutors had not violated the duty to disclose before
the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision reversed Kyles’
conviction.” Harry Connick, DA’s Office Does Not Suppress
Evidence, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 19, 1999.
13
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Brady claims will hold them to account. See, e.g.,
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 66 (2011) (“An

attorney who violates his or her ethical obligations is
subject to professional discipline, including
sanctions,
suspension,
and
disbarment.”).
Unfortunately, minimizing the role of criminal
courts in ensuring prosecutorial accountability has
created a vacuum in which external oversight ceases
to exist. It turns out, perversely, that the Louisiana
judiciary’s Brady rulings undercut the disciplinary
process. In the Angola Five prosecutions, the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown actually
led to the dismissal of the disciplinary complaint
filed against the prosecutors who took the
exculpatory statement. Where a disciplinary body
finds itself bound by adverse judicial rulings and
district attorney offices can only face civil liability in
instances which are virtually impossible to conjure
let alone prove, 14 decisions like Brown relinquish
constitutional rights to the prosecutor’s discretion.
A.

Professional
Sanctions
Against
Louisiana Prosecutors are a Paper
Tiger

Even after this Court’s decisions in Kyles and
Smith, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not
discipline any of the prosecutors responsible for
those
Brady
violations.
The
prosecutorial
See David Keenan, et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial
Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing
Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 216
(2011) (“Connick’s holding that a failure-to-train showing can
14

only be made by demonstrating a pattern of violations—
information that might be difficult for individual plaintiffs to
access—will make such suits exceedingly difficult to win.”).
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wrongdoing that led to the high-profile wrongful
conviction of John Thompson also resulted in no
professional
sanctions
against
practicing
15
prosecutors. In a state with a long and well-known
history of electing aggressive District Attorneys
dismissive of their ethical duties, 16 the body
responsible for investigating ethical complaints and
making disciplinary recommendations to the state
supreme court has only once secured professional
discipline for prosecutorial misconduct. 17 In
Louisiana, the prospect of professional discipline for
failing to disclose exculpatory evidence is a paper
tiger.
It appears that even the process for
registering a complaint with the disciplinary board
becomes an insurmountable obstacle when the
complaint targets a prosecutor. The process operates
differently not on paper but in practice. After an
15 The lone recipient of professional discipline for the
wrongful criminal convictions of John Thompson was a former
prosecutor who had become a defense attorney by the time he
learned of the exculpatory evidence. The Louisiana Supreme
Court reprimanded him for failing to disclose that the dying
prosecutor confessed to suppressing evidence. See In re
Riehlmann, 891 So.2d 1239 (La. 2005); Connick, 563 U.S. at 56
n.1.
16
See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans
Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v.
Thompson, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 913, 925 (2012) (“Thus, it
is hardly surprising that [under Harry Connick] ‘[t]he
prosecutors’ record of compliance with Brady remained dismal
even after Kyles, as evidenced by several Brady violations that
prosecutors committed in trials after April 1995—including in
two capital cases.’” (internal citation omitted)).

See In re Jordan, 913 So.2d 775, 784 (La. 2005)
(handing down a three-month fully-deferred suspension against
prosecutor Roger Jordan for knowingly violating Brady
obligations).
17

16

Orleans Parish trial court granted a defendant’s
motion for new trial because of Brady violations in a
murder case that resulted in a death sentence, one
highly respected member of the bar filed complaints
against every implicated prosecutor. 18 It took two
years for the board to even acknowledge receipt of
these complaints. 19 To this day—almost five years
later—the board has made no recommendations.
Nothing about the state’s ethical standards
explains the lack of professional accountability. In
fact, Louisiana’s ethical rules are more rigorous than
those in most other jurisdictions. Unlike many
states, the Louisiana regime does not contain a
willfulness requirement, meaning prosecutors who
unintentionally violate ethical rules can be held
responsible. See, e.g., LA. ST. BAR ART. 16 RPC Rule
3.8(d); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar
Association in Support of Petitioner Juan Smith
(“ABA Amicus”), 2011 WL 3739380, at *9. 20 With
respect to the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence,
Louisiana’s ethical rules do not maintain a
See Radley Balko, The Untouchables: America’s
Misbehaving Prosecutors, And The System That Protects
Them, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.huffington
18

post.com/2013/08/01/prosecutorial-misconduct-new-orleanslouisiana_n_3529891.html.

19 See Radley Balko, In Louisiana prosecutor offices, a
toxic culture of death and invincibility, WASHINGTON POST, Apr.

6, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp
/2015/04/06/in-louisiana-prosecutor-offices-a-toxic-culture-ofdeath-and-invincibility/.
“To the extent Louisiana has modified Rule 3.8(d), it
has done so . . . only to impose more rigorous disclosure
obligations on prosecutors. The Louisiana rule thus requires
not only disclosure of evidence that the prosecutor ‘knows’ to be
exculpatory but also disclosure of evidence that the prosecutor
‘reasonably should know’ is exculpatory.”
20
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materiality requirement. See ABA Amicus, supra, at
*10; ODC Letter at p. 2 (noting the “sharp debate
across the country” about whether prosecutors
should consider materiality pretrial to comply Rule
3.8(d)); id. (stating “our position that 3.8(d) does not
incorporate” materiality considerations). Thus, the
failure to turn over any evidence favorable to a
criminal defendant represents an ethical breach.
Although the rules thus appear reasonably
protective of the public interest in regulating
prosecutors, we nevertheless see no accountability.
While courts apparently rely on the
disciplinary board to keep prosecutors accountable,
the board appears to rely on judicial rulings to
determine whether some ethical complaints have
merit. In the Angola Five prosecutions, the ODC
noted that “there does not appear to be any
jurisprudence or scholarly analysis suggesting that
there is a variance between what is considered to be
‘favorable’ or ‘mitigating’ under the Brady case-law
versus Rule 3.8(d).” ODC Letter at p. 3. Evidently
stuck with the Louisiana Supreme Court’s finding
that the suppressed statement was not even
“favorable” to co-defendants Brown, Carley, and
Mathis, the ODC closed the investigation and
dismissed the complaint while “reserving the right
. . . to reopen this matter should a different ruling
relevant to the analysis be handed down.” ODC
Letter at p. 4. The complaint’s dismissal corresponds
to the nationwide under-enforcement of professional
rules requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory
evidence. 21
See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It
Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 U. D.C. L.
21

REV. 275, 288 (2004) (finding that
intentionally suppress evidence “are

18

prosecutors who
rarely, if ever,

B.

Civil Liability is Reserved for Only
Extraordinarily Extreme Cases

This Court’s majority opinion in Connick
severely limits the possibility that civil liability will
serve to hold prosecutors accountable or deter
prospective misconduct. There, the Court held that a
single Brady constitutional violation was insufficient
to make the jurisdiction liable for failing to train its
prosecutors to comply with Brady. See Connick, 563
U.S. at 63-64. The majority opinion rejected liability
on Thompson’s failure-to-train theory by relying
upon the fact that prosecutors’ professional
judgments are informed by their law school
education, the bar exam, continuing education
courses, character and fitness requirements, training
received while on the job, and the possibility of
professional discipline. See id. In dissent, Justice
Ginsburg pointed out that “[t]he prosecutorial
concealment Thompson encountered, however, is
bound to be repeated unless municipal agencies bear
responsibility . . . .” Id. at 80 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
Unfortunately, Connick almost completely
insulates prosecuting agencies from civil liability.
“While seemingly narrow in its holding, Connick is
significant because it forecloses one of the few
remaining avenues for holding prosecutors civilly
liable for official misconduct.” Keenan et al., supra
n.14, at 204. Combined with the absolute immunity
conferred to prosecutors for actions taken in their
role as prosecutors, “the Court has created a classic
disciplined”); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against
Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L.

REV. 693, 697-98 (1987) (discussing the absence of ethical
remedies against prosecutors).
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catch-22 in which nobody can be held responsible for
rights violations.” Scott Lemieux, The Impunity of
the Roberts Court, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Apr. 1,
2011,
http://prospect.org/article/impunity-robertscourt. The curtailment of civil remedies heightens
the importance of the traditional remedy of a new
trial.
III.

THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT’S
RULING IN BROWN WILL HAVE SERIOUS
CONSEQUENCES IN LOUISIANA IF IT
STANDS
A.

State v. Brown Enables Prosecutors to
Make Untestable Decisions About What
Constitutes “Favorable” Evidence

Most Brady disputes pivot on the question of
whether the exculpatory evidence is material. Pretrial, Brady leaves it to the prosecutors to decide
materiality questions. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38.
As the oral argument in Smith revealed to this
Court, some prosecutors make highly questionable
judgment calls about materiality. 22 In cases where
suppressed evidence the prosecutors decided pretrial was not material is actually turned over after
trial, Brady provides a framework for courts to
determine whether the conviction or sentence should
be
reversed.
While
prosecutors
somewhat
understandably continue to struggle with their pre-

See Bidish Sarma, Do Supreme Court Justices
Understand How Prosecutors Decide Whether to Disclose
ACSBLOG,
Mar.
17,
2016,
Exculpatory
Evidence?,
22

https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/do-supreme-court-justicesunderstand-how-prosecutors-decide-whether-to-discloseexculpatory.
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trial materiality assessments, 23 see Yaroshefsky,
supra n.16, at 933 n.138, 24 rarely have cases been
decided on the doctrinally prior question of whether
the evidence was “favorable” to the defendant.
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s reasoning in

Brown opens up the possibility that prosecutors will

now utilize their discretion to decide certain types of
evidence that once obviously met the favorability
threshold no longer do. Equipping prosecutors—who
by training learn to see evidence in a light favorable
to the prosecution—with this tool for nondisclosure
above and beyond the already-difficult materiality
assessment raises serious concerns about Brady’s
continued viability. Making ex ante determinations
from a place of inherent cognitive bias, prosecutors
have no reason to fear civil liability or professional
discipline and likely have little concern about state
court review; Brown will embolden them further.

23 “By requiring prosecutors to disclose more than
material exculpatory evidence, the ABA Model Rules seek to
avoid pitfalls that might arise if a prosecutor attempts to
determine materiality before making a disclosure. . . .
[A]ssessing materiality pre-trial requires prosecutors to
‘anticipate what other evidence against the defendant will be
by the end of the trial, and then speculate in hypothetical
hindsight whether the evidence as issue would place ‘the whole
case’ in a different light.’” ABA Amicus, supra, at *10.

“Remarkably, current and some former prosecutors
still defend the Orleans Parish DA’s argument in Smith v. Cain
. . . .”
24

21

B.

State v. Brown Increases the Risk of

Wrongful Conviction and Will Engender
Even More Undiscoverable Brady
Violations

Federal court rulings previously cited
demonstrate that Louisiana courts have often read
Brady so narrowly that evidence that fundamentally
challenges the State’s trial narrative has been
deemed immaterial. See, e.g., Smith, 132 S. Ct. 627;
DiLosa, 279 F.3d 259. In light of Brown, state courts
may not only look skeptically upon defendants’
claims that exculpatory evidence is material, but
they will also provide the prosecution with the
additional benefit of questioning defendants’
contentions that evidence is favorable. Adding an
obstacle to the meaningful enforcement of Brady
increases the risk of wrongful conviction. See, e.g.,
Bennett L. Gershman, Educating Prosecutors and
Supreme Court Justices About Brady v. Maryland,
13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L 517, 541 (2012) (“nondisclosure
of exculpatory evidence may result in the conviction
of an innocent person”); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Innocence Network in Support of Petitioner Juan
Smith, 2011 WL 3678809, at *31-32 n.10-11
(documenting Brady violations that contributed to
wrongful convictions in Orleans Parish).
A significant percentage of the cases in which
Brady violations have come to light are ones in
which defendants were convicted of homicide crimes.
This reality presumably reflects the fact that
Louisiana provides post-conviction counsel to
individuals under a death sentence. See LA. RS
§ 15:169. However, most inmates serving sentences
for non-capital crimes will never obtain postconviction legal representation or gain access to
suppressed evidence. The vast majority of inmates
22

are indigent, and they have no right to counsel after
direct appeal. Even those inmates intrepid enough to
navigate post-conviction’s complexities without a
lawyer
confront
insuperable
investigative
challenges; they are not even permitted to make
requests under Louisiana’s public records law. All of
these factors compound the tautology that many
Brady violations never come to light because they
involve hidden evidence. 25
Giving the State the opportunity to decide
that possibly exculpatory evidence may not be
favorable to the defendant will increase pre-trial
suppression. Brown will thus engender even more
undiscoverable Brady noncompliance. Because “[i]t
is far too easy for Brady violations to pass unnoticed
. . . . awarding new trials when violations are
discovered is essential to promote justice in those
cases and all others, by holding prosecutors to
account when infractions surface.” Brief of Amicus
Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers in Support of Petitioner Juan Smith, 2011
WL 3739472, at *21 (emphasis in original).
CONCLUSION
This case presents a critical opportunity for
this Court to prevent the erosion of Brady in a
jurisdiction with both a high volume of criminal
prosecutions and a history of state court difficulty
with the doctrine. Considering that the ethical
complaint lodged against the very same prosecutors
who obtained Mr. Brown’s death sentence was
See Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not
Work: A Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in Their Obligation
to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA
25

CLARA L. REV. 303, 306 (2010) (concluding that “it is fair to
assume that most Brady violations go undiscovered”).
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dismissed because of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
opinion in Brown, professional discipline is off of the
table. This Court should grant certiorari because the
state courts need guidance, other mechanisms for
holding prosecutors accountable have not functioned,
and, left alone, the Brown ruling has the potential to
usher in a new, darker age of disregard for Brady.
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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A
LOUISIANA ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY BOARD
OFFICE OF THE DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
4000 S. Sherwood Forest Blvd.
Suite 607
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70816
(225) 293-3900 . 1-800-326-8022 .
FAX (225) 293-3300
February 29, 2016
Lawrence T. Dupre
19929 Old Scenic Highway
Zachary, Louisiana 70791
Re: Respondent: Thomas Stanford Block
(ODC File No. 0029050)
Hugo A. Holland, Jr.
(ODC File No. 0029051)
Complainant: Clayton M. Perkins, Thomas J.
Thompson & Lawrence T.
Dupre
Dear Mr. Dupre:
The purpose of this correspondence is to
address the complaint that you filed with this office
pursuant to your obligation under Rule 8.3(a) of the
Rules of Professional Conduct against Hugo Holland
and Thomas Block regarding their ethical
obligations under Rule 3.8(d). Specifically, your
complaint brought to the attention of the ODC the
facts regarding the failure to disclose a recorded
inmate statement, recounting what he had been told
1

by Angola 5 inmate Barry Edge, regarding the tragic
slaying of prison guard Captain David Knapp.
From our investigation we determined that
there was no factual dispute that the recorded
statement, taken by Block and Holland, was not
turned over to the defense in the matter of State of
Louisiana vs. David Brown. Rather, in our judgment
the only dispute was whether or not the contents of
the statement was favorable to the accused to be
used to mitigate the offense or sentence; and
whether or not the provisions of Rule 3.8(d)
incorporate the “materiality to outcome” component
of the U.S. Supreme Court line of cases including
Brady and its progeny.
As you may be aware, there is a sharp debate
across the country as to whether the “materiality to
outcome” component comprises a part of the analysis
to be undertaken by prosecutors pretrial who seek to
comply with the provisions of Rule 3.8(d). It is our
position that 3.8(d) does not incorporate the
“materiality to outcome” considerations for many
reasons, and that inferentially our court has already
spoken to that issue in its disciplinary decision in In
Re: Jordan. Our initial belief was bolstered by the
trial judge’s grant of a new trial as to sentence in the
Brown case where he determined that the withheld
recorded statement was favorable to the accused and
material as to outcome.
The Court of Appeal reversed that
determination on the issue of materiality, but may
have used an erroneous standard when analyzing
the issue. The Supreme Court on Friday February
19th denied writs in a 4-3 decision. In doing so, a
majority of the Court found that the recorded
statement was neither ‘favorable’ nor ‘material’. I
2

note that while the Chief Justice dissented with
reasons, two of the other justices dissented without
reasons, but would have granted the writ and
docketed the matter.
As indicated above, there is a significant
debate across the country regarding the scope of
Rule 3.8(d) and it has divided states on the issue. At
its essence, the cornerstone is whether or not 3.8(d)
is ‘co-extensive’ with Brady such that a showing of
“materiality to outcome” must be shown, or whether
the “materiality to outcome” is not a component of
the ethical consideration. Inasmuch as I view the
“materiality to outcome” component as a backward
looking consideration, I do not hold the belief that
“materiality” should be or is a factor in analyzing
prosecutor conduct under 3.8(d). However, there
does not appear to be any jurisprudence or scholarly
analysis suggesting that there is a variance between
what is considered to be ‘favorable’ or ‘mitigating’
under the Brady case-law versus Rule 3.8(d).
Because the Louisiana Supreme Court has
found, specifically, that the recorded statement at
issue was not ‘favorable’ in the Brown matter, that
legal determination pretermits the issue of whether
it was “material to outcome”. Simply put, the
prosecutor’s duty to disclose the recorded statement
turns on whether it tends to negate guilt, mitigates
the offense, or is otherwise mitigating information as
to sentencing. If the determination is that it is not
‘favorable’ in these ways, the failure of the
prosecutor to disclose is not a violation of Rule 3.8(d)
and the “materiality to outcome” analysis is not
reached.
Because the same Court that would consider
the potential ethics violation has already determined
3

that the statement was not ‘favorable’, the filing of a
disciplinary charge in this matter cannot be
sustained at this time. I recognize that the
defendant may challenge this ruling and that there
exists the potential for a different outcome on this
threshold issue. For that reason, I have determined
that it is appropriate to close this investigation and
dismiss this complaint at this time, reserving the
right for this office to reopen this matter should a
different ruling relevant to the analysis be handed
down. A disciplinary prosecution at this juncture is
unlikely to be successful and would be in effect ‘res
judicata’ on the disciplinary violation precluding a
‘retrial’ of the issue should the outcome change on
appellate or writ review by a different court.
Pursuant to Rule XIX, section 11(b)(3), you
nonetheless have the right to request that this
dismissal decision be reviewed by an independent
hearing committee. To exercise that right you must
notify this office in writing within 30 days of this
dismissal decision.
I thank you for bringing this issue to the
attention of the ODC, and for your concerns for the
ethical standards of our legal profession.
Sincerely,

/s/ Charles B. Plattsmier
Charles B. Plattsmier
Chief Disciplinary Counsel
CBP/kgm
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